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Recognition Within the Limits of Reason: Remarks on Pippin’s Hegel’s Practical
Philosophy

DAVID INGRAM
Loyola University Chicago, USA

Since the publication of Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism and the Politics of
Recognition in 1989,1 the concept of recognition has re-emerged as a central if not
dominant category of moral and political philosophy. Taylor’s use of Hegel’s seminal
category to defend group rights aimed at securing legal and public recognition of the
distinctive identities of groups resonated with critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas,
Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, and above all Axel Honneth, who elevated the category of
recognition to the most foundational of moral and social categories.2 Honneth, for
example, drew on the research of developmental psychologists, such as Jessica Benjamin
and Donald Winnicott, as well as pragmatists, such as G. H. Mead, all of whom had used
the category of recognition to explain how a sense of self emerges from the empathetic
identification with primary caretakers.3 The accent here on social recognition as a
precognitive basis for individuation has been understood, in turn, as a condition for
psychological wholeness and well-being or, more radically, as a transcendental condition
for the possibility of any relation to the self whatsoever. In the meantime, critics – many
of them influenced by poststructuralists currents of thought – have argued that the
category of recognition, with its implied identification and reconciliation with the other,
designates an impossible and perhaps even undesirable achievement.4
Correspondence Address: David Ingram, Department of Philosophy, Loyola
University Chicago, 6525 N. Sheridan Rd., Chicago, IL 60660, USA. Email:
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Perhaps they are right. For now I wish only to raise an important challenge to the
dominant theories of recognition listed above, insofar as they claim to accurately reflect
Hegel’s view on the matter. In Hegel’s Practical Philosophy (2008), Robert Pippin
argues that Hegel’s mature concept of recognition is properly understood as an
ontological category referring exclusively to what it means to be a free, rational
individual, or agent.5 I agree with Pippin that recognition for Hegel functions in this
capacity. However, I shall argue that conceiving it this way also requires that we
conceive it as a political category in the sense described above. Furthermore, while Hegel
insists that recognition must be concrete – mediated by actors who hold one another
accountable according to institutional norms implicit in their actual social roles – I argue,
appealing to Hegel himself, that social crisis impels actors to transcend their roles and
adopt abstract points of view more in keeping with philosophical forms of reflection.
Such “alienation” – so ardently embraced by postmodernists – need not undermine the
possibility of recognition as an ontological category, as Pippin fears, but rather comports
with the expressivist theory of action he imputes to Hegel, which describes the socially
recognized intentions, rationales, and identities – not to mention, freedom - of actors as
unfolding in interminable dialog.
Pippin’s argument may be summarized as follows:
1. Action is not adequately identified and explained without appeal to actor’s
intentions.
2. Actor’s intentions are only manifest to him or her through other actors’
responses. One cannot be certain of what one has intended and what kind of a
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person one is until after one has acted and one’s actions have been judged by
others.
3. The social interpretation of actor’s intentions unfolds when the actor is
challenged to justify his action with reasons that are recognized by others.
4. Such recognition is concrete, since the reasons in questions refer to
institutional norms that are accepted by everyone. Recognition between actors
implies mutual accountability but not strict equality in social status; nor does
it require that actors feel esteemed in the eyes of the other.
5. The agent’s successful justification of his action to others is what is properly
meant by freedom. Recognition thus functions principally as a minimal
condition for freedom, not as a transcendental condition for selfhood or
consciousness.
6. Reasons that refer to abstract ideas, purely formal norms, or hypothetical
(counterfactual) thought experiments that completely abstract from actual
institutional norms have no social basis and therefore cannot serve as grounds
for social justification and recognition.
7. Philosophy essentially offers reasons that are abstract, formal, and
hypothetical.
8. Therefore philosophy cannot enter into concrete social critique, informing us
about what we ought to do; when it goes against this proscription it presents
itself as potentially destructive. So philosophers cannot contribute to
extending our understanding of ourselves as free agents; viz., they cannot
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enlighten us in a way we might recognize as normatively extending our
shared, institutional identities.

In what follows I shall accept premises 1-8 as positions that are properly
attributed to Hegel.

Premise 6 strikes me as true only if one assumes that

counterfactual forms of reasoning completely abstract from actual institutional
norms. Premises 7-8 are likewise conditionally true, so that if it turns out to be the
case that social philosophy engages in formal and counterfactual forms of
reasoning that do not abstract from actual institutional norms, then they are false.
Premise 4 strikes me as partly questionable, since being accorded the status of
rational agent and fellow interlocutor is a form of esteem that is constrained by
relations of domination. Recognition therefore unavoidably carries with it a
political connotation.

I

Before delving into Pippin’s argument in detail, let me first begin by clarifying
what he means by saying that recognition is an ontological category. To say that
recognition is an ontological category does not imply that it is natural,
unchanging, and given all at once with the advent of human life. Insofar as Hegel
regards freedom, rationality, and individuality as historical achievements of the
human spirit, recognition, too, acquires for him the status of an historical
achievement. Therefore, it is not properly understood as a transcendental
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condition for the bare possibility of subjectivity, selfhood, relation to self, or selfconsciousness, insofar as these capabilities can be attributed to children as well as
adult human beings prior to acquiring access to skill sets and institutional
opportunities associated with rational agency. For Hegel, recognition is simply a
necessary condition for the possibility of experiencing oneself as a free, rationally
accountable individual (HPP, 185).

Nor is Hegel’s notion of recognition a condition of psychic wellness and selfesteem of the sort that figures in the political struggles for recognition discussed by
Taylor, Honneth and others. Indeed, Pippin insists that it is senseless to demand as a
political goal, or as a matter of right, the kind of recognition Hegel is talking about, for
that demand would be meaningless outside of any institution that hadn’t already
actualized mutual recognition among political agents. Rather, to the extent that Hegel
develops what Pippin calls a “recognitive politics” as an alternative to other liberal
political rationales of a consequentialist or rights-based nature, such a politics will be first
and foremost grounded in institutionally defined social roles, or shared identities
grounded in concrete universal norms (HPP, 242, 250, 258, 265).6
In sum, no matter how important recognition might be for personal psychological
health, basic self-awareness, and political justice between groups, it is not the sort of
recognition that Hegel philosophically defends as the telos of fully actualized action.
Indeed, according to Pippin, these psychological and political conceptions of recognition
are of a different caliber entirely. A group’s achieving mutual recognition from other
groups regarding the worth of its own members’ distinctive racial, gender, or cultural
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identity may be a necessary condition for inter-group dialogue so essential to achieving
political justice, understood as equality in the legal and political distribution of social
esteem, say, but it is not, in Pippin’s reading of Hegel, a necessary condition for enabling
the group’s members to act in a rational and responsible manner as individual agents.
Likewise, achieving emotional bonding and identification with caretakers may be a
necessary developmental stage in the process of becoming a fully balanced human being,
and it may even well be that absent any such bonding at all infants could never become
persons who experience themselves as subjects who live in a meaningful world of
objects.7 But having been recognized in this precognitive, emotive or empathetic manner
of identification is not part of what it means to be a rational actor.
Deleted: ,

Pippin mentions another reason why conceptions of psychological fulfillment are
not central to Hegel’s philosophical project. That project consists in presenting and
defending a form of argument that is internal to free thought, or reason, itself, understood
as radically self-determining, socially embedded, mental life (Geist). This is not to deny
that there are natural - and to that extent, partly pre-rational – conditions underlying
thought and action. Hegel’s idealism does not require that he disregard the physical world
and its impact on empirical psychology. However, explanation of human agency cannot
be reduced to causal explanation without loss of its proper subject matter, which is
reason, or thought, as embodied in concrete action. To the extent that practical
philosophy forgets its proper form of idealism and adopts the external, observational and
objectifying standpoint of empirical psychology and anthropology, it does a profound
injustice to our inner understanding of ourselves as fully free, rationally accountable,
agents.
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This explains Pippin’s discomfort with respect to left-Hegelian critiques of
alienation. Such examples of philosophical anthropology take us away from the Kantian
legacy back to a pre-critical Aristotelianism, where rational criticism relies upon an
account of human nature, understood as a prior constraint determining volition and
thought from without.8 But, according to Pippin, to view alienation as a state of
unfulfilled nature, as dehumanization, and recognition as restoration of psychic
wholeness and humanity, is to think of recognition as something that is natural, always
present in some form, however diminished, and thus as an original constraint rather than
as a freely accomplished result. This way of conceiving recognition goes against the grain
of Hegel’s thinking, which holds that the determinations of free action – recognition
included - must themselves be the product of action.

II
Now that we have clarified Pippin’s claim that Hegel’s concept of recognition is best
understood as an ontological presupposition, let’s look more closely at his argument
purporting to show this to be the case. Pippin’s main project is to defend what he
regards as Hegel’s highly counterintuitive notion of freedom against the apparently
intuitive traditional conception. The traditional conception conceives of freedom as a
causal power innate within the individual. In the empiricist tradition of Hobbes, Locke
and Hume, the will can be said to be free if its decision to pursue this or that desire is
unhindered by external impediment. The transcendentalist tradition inaugurated by Kant
goes further than this by reasonably insisting that the mere faculty of choice (Willkür)
provides a poor foundation for freedom so long as the rational, calculating will remains in
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thrall to pre-rational inclination. But Kant’s idea of a spontaneous “uncaused” volitional
agency that inhabits some otherworldly noumenal realm while somehow acting in the real
world is scarcely philosophically satisfying. How can mere respect for an abstract and
empty conception of formal practical reason (the categorical imperative) motivate action,
i.e., provide sufficient reason to act this way rather than that, apart from worldly desire?
Hegel’s solution to this dilemma involves radically reconceiving the way in which
Kant’s idea of autonomy as self-legislation is understood. Instead of thinking of
autonomy as simply a function of individually exercised practical reasoning, Hegel thinks
of it as a dialogical accomplishment in which agents invest their desires in the rational
form of validity claims whose reasonableness they then justify to other agents in terms
that these other agents recognize and accept.
Hegel’s mature defense of this recognitive account of freedom (premises 1 -5
in my reconstruction) proceeds at many levels. In the Phenomenology, his attention is
focused on in the dialectical confrontation between the claims and counterclaims of forms
of consciousness. As is well known, the section of the Phenomenology in which Hegel
discusses the dialectic of self-consciousness (culminating in the relationship between
master and servant) disabuses us of any conceit in our own autochthony in its compelling
account of why natural self-consciousness cannot be free on its own. This account
rearticulates an earlier argument that Fiche had developed in his Grundlage des
Naturrechts (1796): to wit, that autonomy first arises when human beings distinguish
themselves from animals by transforming their immediate, natural desires into claims, or
demands, addressed to others and requiring their recognition. The opportunity to effect
this transformation thus depends on challenge from the other. The problem with the
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master-servant relationship that supposedly resolves the existential struggle to the death
between persons who demand unreciprocated recognition of their freedom is its
incapacity to rise above the fundamental contradiction that recognition cannot be
compelled and, indeed, cannot affirm the superior sovereignty of one when given
unfreely from another who is deemed to be little more than an object. Although the
servant achieves a certain awareness of his own freedom in fearing death, postponing
satisfaction of natural need, and dominating nature through labor, neither he nor the lord
can achieve subjective certainty of their autonomy and, indeed, cannot be free, because
they lack the moral, legal, and ethical preconditions in which they might transform their
immediate demands into rationally justifiable validity claims requiring mutual
recognition.
This recognitive account of freedom is first developed by Hegel in a later
section of the Phenomenology devoted to action as an expression of intention that has
significance for others. In the section concluding the chapter on reason, entitled
“Individuality which Takes Itself to be Real in and for Itself,” we learn “that a person
cannot know what he [really] is until he has made himself a reality through action” (para
401). The “purpose” and “matter at hand” in his acting, however, comes to light only as it
is expressed and taken up by others, thereby showing that the pure integrity of one’s
willing is a chimera. Agents may “pretend that their actions and efforts are something for
themselves alone in which they have only themselves and their essential nature in mind,”
but “in doing something, and thus in bringing themselves out into the light of day, they
directly contradict by their deed their pretense of wanting to exclude the glare of publicity
and participation by all and sundry” (para. 417).
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Finally, in chapter six, subsection (c) entitled “Spirit that is Certain of Itself:
Morality,” we encounter this dialectic of rudimentary communicative interaction played
out on a higher register – the register of social critique, if you will. Dealing not with the
abstract determinants of rational action (means and ends) but with the ostensible purity of
moral conscience, Hegel emphatically shows that the subjective convictions of moral
agents remain essentially incomplete and indeterminate in meaning – lacking in
conviction and objective reality - until they are expressed in actions and not only declared
in a self-validating way but justified convincingly with reasons before other persons
whom the actor recognizes as having the right to judge (paras. 645, 653). Although the
forms of consciousness that inhabit this moral world only recognize their own subjective
convictions - the result of having seen behind the emptiness of applying a Kantian
universal law of reason that transcends any determinate subjective prescription - there is
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a sense in which each asserts his own convictions as normatively binding for everyone
else, as if one’s inner voice had the same authority as God’s command (paras. 655-56).9
Acting as if his subjective conviction were universally binding for society, the spectatorjudge (who, for the purposes of this essay, can be compared to the inactive philosophersocial critic or inactive community of political deliberators) accuses the acting agent of
Deleted: are

hypocrisy by showing that the meaning of the agent’s actions is not, contrary to the
agent’s beliefs, exhausted by the agent’s claimed moral intentions, since from the
subjective perspective of the judge’s convictions, these actions appear to have been
morally motivated by such evil, egocentric desires as fame and ambition (para. 665). But
in coaxing a confession of wrong from the agent, the hard-hearted judge - who in playing
Deleted: his

the “beautiful soul” refuses to act for fear of getting her own hands dirty - can scarcely be
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said to claim with convincing conviction that she and not the actor is right, and indeed
can also be accused of hypocrisy for betraying a commitment to universal right by
Deleted: his

withdrawing into the inner sanctum of her own subjective self-certainty (paras 658, 66365). Forgiveness comes when both actor and judge mutually confess their hypocrisy and
recognize their mutual accountability to one another in the course of both simultaneously
playing out the dual role of actor and judge. Realizing that deliberative judgments and
action-oriented convictions must be backed by reasons that can be communicated to and
validated by others heals the wounds of past recrimination, for it enables actor and judge
to acknowledge the inextricable connection between subjective conviction and social
recognition, acting out of singular self-interest and reconciling that rationale with a social
judgment affirming that rationale’s universal worth (paras. 667-71).
To paraphrase the moral of this story in a way that Hegel might have accepted
had he lived in our post-Wittgensteinian world, we could say that the reasons given by
agents for acting and judging do not count as reasons unless they can enter into a
language game of challenge and justification in which they are recognized as compelling
by others. Any gap between agent’s and judge’s assessment of what the agent did marks a
gap in recognition and, therewith, a gap in the agent’s own certainty that what he or she
thought she did is what he or she did in fact; and that experience of self-alienation is
tantamount to an experience of unfreedom, or absence of self-determination.10
Pippin relies on Hegel’s mature writings in the Philosophy of Right and in the
Encyclopedia to flesh out the implications of this conception of recognitive freedom
further. The important points developed in these writings are as follows: If freedom, or
taking ownership of one’s inclinations, volitions, and intentions – requires transforming
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these subjective events into rationally justifiable validity claims addressed to and
recognized by others (as Habermas would say) – then it also requires an intersubjectively
recognized framework in which asserting and redeeming individual claims makes sense.
Deleted: a

That framework is the modern state, understood not merely as government but as shared
political understanding firmly anchored in what we today would loosely identify as a
liberal and democratic ethos. In other words, it is only within a modern state that
objectively recognizes individual freedom and responsibility through legal institutions
such as private property, accountable legislative representation, and so on and further
grounds these formal institutions in substantive traditions expressing common values,
aims, and meanings as well as concrete narrative identities based on intersubjectively
recognized roles, that something like genuine individual self-ownership can happen.
Deleted: Two

A further point bears mentioning with regard to this institutional conception of
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practical reason. Justification will be constrained by – or, to put in the more positive
terms favored by Pippin and Hegel, reconciled to – particular social roles and functions;
in other words, justification will not be free to methodically detach itself from these roles
as if aspiring to become a formal test for determining how any rational speaker or hearer
or actor or judge would justify the action in question.

[T]he reflection and deliberation essential to such a subjective dimension (the
entertaining of considerations about what one ought to do) are not formalizable,
do not involve a method or permanent set of moral rules or a moral law or any
sort of moral calculation. One deliberates, as he [Hegel] says, “qua ethical being”
(sittliches Wesen). This means that considerations such as “because I am her
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father” or “because that is what a good businessman does,” or “you cannot,
because that is my property,” or “because I am a citizen” simply are practical
reasons. They are not initial steps requiring a full deduction of a further claim
that, say, one ought always to do as is required of a modern citizen of a
Rechtsstaat, all before a subjectively offered reason could really be convincing or
successful. The Kantian conception of autonomy and rationality that supports
such an intuition is, Hegel claims, a dangerous fantasy (HPP, 274).

The philosopher’s temptation to think that there must be some more general, abstract
reason supporting the social functional reasons proffered by everyday agents is simply
mistaken, for such a reason could not provide a motive for acting that would be more
concretely meaningful and prescriptive than the reason institutionally provided. Thus,
Habermas’s formal pragmatic account of accountability, in which actors also play
institutionally unconstrained abstract social roles of speaker and listener apart from their
institutionally constrained social roles of, say, doctor and patient, adds nothing to the
sorts of specific claims and justifications that a doctor might raise or make with respect to
a patient. In justifying the truth of a diagnosis or the rightness of a prescribed regimen of
care to the patient the doctor should not have to appeal to a general theory of knowledge
or a general moral theory. “Grounded in controlled observation” or “cost-beneficial” or
“in accordance with respecting the inherent dignity of the human being” are not reasons
that would conceivably justify a concrete judgment taken in abstraction from the
particular institutional context.11 Radically questioning the truth of science or the
appropriateness of medical practice is merely the idle fancy of philosophers who are free
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to adopt wholly abstract and transcendent notions of rational justification, truth, and
rightness in their “professional” capacity as purely rational speakers and listeners,
unencumbered by the constraints of action.

III

We are now in a position to restate premises 6-8 of Hegel’s argument. Pippin’s
Hegel thinks that the recognitive nature of historically situated rational agency limits the
kinds of reasons we can bring to bear in criticizing social institutions, in two respects.
According to Pippin’s Hegel, we are not entitled, as rational agents, to engage in
hypothetical (or counterfactual) arguments, if the form the argument takes is that we
could not consent to these institutions as purely rational beings, viz., beings whom we
imagine are free to reason without being constrained in their thinking by actual social
institutions.12 This kind of thought experiment is either vacuous or meaningful in a
dangerous way, in that it invites individuals to imagine that they are being impartial
when they are in fact imposing their own subjective opinions on the rest of us without so
much as making a token gesture on behalf of what the rest of us, who participate in and
identify with society and its norms, might think.
Such formal reasoning – with its implicit subjectivism and volunteerism –is the
reverse side of that pre-critical, substantive reasoning advanced by Aristotelians. This
reasoning, which rejects the formalist appeal to ideal procedure in favor of an intuitive
appeal to substantive human capacities, implies a form of moral realism that contradicts
the self-legislating nature of rational moral agency. 13
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So both formal and substantive criticism, Pippin maintains, would be regarded by
Hegel as “external” to the internal, participatory standpoint of rational agents whose
justificatory reasons are in some important sense determined (or delimited) by the
concrete logical space of the historically finite ethical life (Sittlichkeit) they inhabit. If
the justificatory reasons for social critique proffered by contractarian proceduralists and
communitarian realists are ruled out as philosophically incoherent and practically
“dangerous” (perhaps even “pathological,” as Pippin sometimes suggests), it might then
seem that Pippin’s Hegel could at least allow reasons that criticize the existing ethos
immanently, for failing to live up to its underlying telos (or idea). This is true for Hegel,
but only with qualification: we cannot understand such reasons as including a claim that
individuals are entitled by right to such an ethos.
According to Pippin’s Hegel, to demand as a right the actualization of the social
conditions underlying one’s agency – where such conditions are understood to include
the having of rights - is philosophically incoherent, in that it “puts the cart before the
horse” (HPP, 257). It makes no sense to claim a right to the presuppositions for claiming
a right. Claiming a right to the presuppositions for a claiming a right would lead us down
a bottomless pit of demands. Furthermore, the presupposition for claiming rights –
mutual, unconstrained recognition between persons who hold one another accountable as
claimants – is not the sort of thing that can be legally enforced in the way that rights
claims must be if they are to count as rights. How does one compel free recognition of a
claim without committing a performative contradiction?14
Once again, recognition is here seen as an ontological condition, not an object of
political struggle undertaken in the name of advancing rights, even though recognition
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itself plainly rests on a political institution incorporating the principle of rights. However,
if the ordinary political activity of claiming and justifying rights is not what originally
brings the principle of rights into existence in the first place, it might be asked: What is?
For Hegel, that answer, of course, is history. It is history – not abstract reason – that
justifies this activity; and it is historical, dialectical philosophy – not abstract,
counterfactual philosophy – that interprets the logical course of events.

IV

I will examine whether Hegel’s historical justification of modern rights – as stated above
– is sufficiently dialectical and convincing. Presently I wish to focus on another question:
Can Pippin’s Hegel consistently exclude abstract, counterfactual reasoning from the
recognized play of practical arguments in everyday life? A glance at Pippin’s favorable
comparison between Hegel’s account of concrete rational accountability and that
contained in Robert Brandom’s Making it Explicit (1994) suggests that it cannot.
Brandom’s inferentialist account of action posits intersubjectivity as a prior
condition of rational agency. Persons hold one another accountable for the commitments
that can be inferred from the assertions they make about themselves, others, and the
world around them as they interact with others. They are entitled to these commitments
only to the extent that others can rely on them in fashioning their own commitments. But
Brandom understands the role that communication plays in this process as mainly
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passive; we listen to what others say, observe what they do, and keep score of who is
committed to what, being ever vigilant to ferret out conflicting or inconsistent
commitments. It is important for me to be able to take over another’s commitment,
although doing so does not guarantee that what I and that other person understand by that
commitment is identical (for each of us inserts that claim into our own unique inferential
system of commitments).
Importantly, in Brandom’s account of accountability, agreement in
understanding is not a full-bodied dialogical achievement of the sort that Pippin attributes
to Hegel recognitive account of freedom. On Brandom’s account, entitlement to a
commitment will depend on consistency with the dominant commitments of one’s
society. But entitlement in this sense can be determined by simple observation, in the
same way that a jury (to cite Habermas) keeps a tally of the points scored by the
defendant and the plaintiff in a trial.15 Nothing in Brandom’s account of entitlement
requires that agents actively acquire assent from others by justifying their commitments
in the face of direct challenges.
On the other hand, Brandom’s commitment to objectivity and truth should
incline him to embrace a more robustly dialogical rendering of entitlement.16 Achieving
objectivity in one's understanding would seem to require testing one's taken-for-granted,
subjectively held assumptions in the crucible of dialogical questioning. Furthermore, in
asserting our claim to be valid as a matter of objective truth we imply that all persons
could be rationally persuaded to accept it. Of course, we cannot assume that any given
dialogical exchange of arguments would ever suffice to exhaustively justify the truth of
any controversial claim once and for all. Real dialogs are imperfect vehicles for
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conclusively establishing anything, since there are always arguments and points of view
that have not been expressed. This has led Habermas to conclude that the idea of truth
anticipates a temporally unlimited, viz., fully inclusive, fully free, and fully equal
exchange of arguments, what he sometimes refers to as the ideal speech situation.17
The implication of this counterfactual ideal notion of dialogical accountability for
a recognitive theory of practical reason would seem to be something of the following:
Being able to recognize oneself as a fully rational agent depends on recognition from
others who relate to one in the dialogical role of “equal interlocutor,” but such
recognition appears to be, in retrospect, always constrained and temporally incomplete.
This accords with Pippin’s expressivist view of action: full self-certainty – or full selfownership – of what one is doing depends on what an indefinite number of our fellow
interlocutors decides one is doing according to an ever-changing matrix of shared
reasons. One’s agreement with others in this open-ended process of dialogue would be
achievable, if we can be forgiven the expression, only in the fullness of time itself. One's
rationale for one's actions may be recognized by others sufficient to permit a modicum of
rational self-certainty, but this recognition could not in principle be conclusive, because
the ideal preconditions under which it could be met are never given.

V
Recognition thus appears to be simultaneously factual and counterfactual, given but, in
retrospect, not fully so. Because it is not given, it cannot be accomplished within the
parameters of finite ethical life, if what one understands by ethical life is time-bound
conventional reason. But this conclusion would appear to contradict Hegel’s own

18

optimistic claims about the fully realized fact of freedom for those participating in the
actual institutions that make up the modern state.18 What these claims suggest is a
complete reconciliation with the modern state as it currently exists, based on
unshakeable, viz., final and absolute, reasons about who we are and what we are doing.
Such triumphalism has led Honneth and Habermas, for instance, to conclude that Hegel
jettisoned the forward-looking, dialogical account of rational justification so strikingly
evident in his System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit dating back to 180204 for the backward-looking, monological justification present in the Jena
Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. Beginning with this latter work, Hegel putatively
defends the absolute incarnation of reason; viz., a final true understanding of ourselves as
completely free, by direct appeal to humanity’s inevitable, divine-like march to the
modern state, behind the backs of agents and quite independently of any dialogical
reflection they might have undertaken in enlightening themselves about the imperfect
rationality of their social relations.19
One therefore suspects that the cunning of reason (List der Vernunft), as Hegel
understands the developmental logic underlying history, has its own rationale that far
exceeds the reasons of finite acting subjects. To say that this rationale compels
submission - on pain of one’s being rendered less of a rational agent – suggests that a
person could not in principle freely and with reason elect to excuse himself or herself
from the prevailing discourses in which he or she is expected to render a rational account.
From the standpoint of the radical dissident who questions the presumed freedom,
symmetry and consensuality of rational dialog as well as the impartiality of the dominant
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lingua franca, the expectation that he or she give rational account to others might well
appear to be an unreasonable – externally imposed – demand.
.

Now, Pippin might respond to this objection in the following way (HPP, 276).

Unless one buys into the implausible view that norms, such as the equality of all persons
Deleted: timeless moral

as bearers of fundamental rights, are facts of reason that have existed in all societies since
time immemorial, albeit in partial or distorted, or unclear form, then one is inescapably
thrown back onto some grand narrative about historical progress in justifying such norms.
Common knowledge has it that Hegel here commits a kind of genetic fallacy; that
he conflates historical necessity, historical possibility, or historical facticity with what is
morally right. But the normative ethos that informs our modern understanding of what it
means to be rational is not simply the result of a kind of natural fate or metaphysical
cunning of reason, as my earlier objection would have it. Following Pippin’s reading,
Hegel seems to be distinguishing between a developmental logic – the telos of collective
action, if you will – and its actual historical realization. Because the telos of collective
action can be philosophically discerned only after the fact of its substantial if indeed
imperfect actualization, it cannot be what motivates (behind the backs of historical
agents) its own realization. Rather, that work is the achievement of historical “agents” or
persons who are on the way to becoming agents in the fullest sense of the term.
So the proper way to interpret Hegel’s account of the actualization of reason is
to stress the role that imperfectly rational social agents play in “freely” constituting, in
some unintended way, their own agency across time. The fuller meaning of their action
unfolds over time, with the philosopher as interlocutor-judge dialogically questioning and
partly contributing to the action’s objective meaning. Although, as our discussion of
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moral conscience shows, the philosopher judge cannot be a mere spectator, but must also
act and be held accountable to the historical agents whose actions she in turn is judging –
to recall Marx’s famous third thesis on Feuerbach, the educator must be educated by
those s/he educates – the philosopher nonetheless acts in a distinctly theoretical; viz.,
philosophical way. From the retrospective standpoint of the philosopher, history can be
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interpreted as if it were the culmination of a developmental logic. Following Pippin’s
reading of Hegel, that logic itself does not pre-exist the actions of historically agents, as
though in the beginning that logic, rather than their incompletely actualized, still all-toosubjective intentions causally explained their actions. Rather, we are to understand that
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rationally individuated activity.

VI
This account of reflective action guiding its own self-actualization has much to
recommend it. But we still need an account of social crisis that explains how such action
arises, with all of its progressive, emancipatory potential. Take the example of the
dissident who refuses to reason about society in the way that conventional roles would
dictate. Hegel is not claiming that one must always account for one’s action by appeal to
conventional roles, least of all when the rules and terms of the game of rational dialog are
suspected of being less rational than what they purport to be. This situation arises in
moments of social breakdown, when our ethical identity is shattered and we seem torn
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between conflicting social roles. Hegel’s famous gloss on Sophocles’ portrayal of the
conflict between Creon and Antigone in the Phenomenology illustrates the breakdown of
an imperfectly rational ethos in which roles of citizen and family member cannot be
harmonized because neither citizen nor family member can give a satisfactory rationale to
the other that could justify what he or she is doing. Contrast this breakdown with our
modern form of social crisis. In a modern society that has incorporated robust rational
accountability all the way down to its core, individuals identify with their multiple social
roles less rigidly and dogmatically. Our cultural conflicts don’t lead to a wholesale
abandonment of rational accountability toward others, even if they produce skepticism
and alienation. Such skepticism now appears to be reasonable to the extent that
questioning oneself – impelled by challenges from others –is “natural” and finds
institutional support. One draws from science in questioning law; or one draws from
religion in questioning science. It doesn’t matter that the sources of socially recognized
reasons aren’t strictly universal, so long as there remains at least one overarching
institutional support – such as respect for basic human rights – that is. When respect for
abstract morality and its concrete embodiment in the concrete civil and political rights of
a particular nation diminishes – as is the case with modern forms of ideological
fundamentalism – so does respect for modern reason.
So defending Hegel against the charge of conservatism is certainly possible
when we realize that abstract moral reflection itself is institutionalized in modern
societies for whom social crisis itself has become a permanent, if somewhat tamed,
condition. Again, suppose one of the instituted language games in our society is a
language of human rights that functions, in part, as a common basis for holding other
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nations rationally accountable and, in part, as a common lingua franca for disputing and
resolving moral claims between rival religious and secular groups. Persons who are asked
to render an account of their behavior in terms of the reasons afforded by this language
game are asked to do so in ways that any rational human being might accept. The
universal validity they claim for their reasoning will require that they abstract from the
particular ethos they inhabit, or at the very least, hypothetically imagine the possibility of
such abstraction. That is to say, they must be able to hypothetically free themselves from
the limits of their own ethos and even (perhaps) radically question this ethos.
Now, Hegel might reserve the right of the philosopher to hypothetically
question say, the modern enlightenment ethos, as he and generations of critical theorists
have done; but like the late Wittgenstein, he probably wouldn’t deem this to be an
entirely appropriate reflection on the part of everyday citizens.20 Note that the problem
with this kind of totalizing ethical reflection has nothing to do with foundationalism.
Radical questioning doesn’t require suspending all our practical judgments at once.
Having exorcised the bogeyman of presuppositionless certainty, we can still question our
ethos dialectically, from within its circular course of reasoning. Rawls, for example,
never denied that his counterfactual contractarian thought experiment, which was aimed
at extrapolating general principles of justice for criticizing society, was anything more
than a stylized rational reconstruction of commonly shared fixed judgments with respect
to the acceptability or unacceptability of particular practices.
Regardless, then, of whether one agrees with Rawls’s theory of justice and his
peculiar framing of the argument in support of it, the counterfactual reasoning it exhibits
is not obviously alien to our modern ethos. Therefore, conceding that average citizens,
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too, can be entitled to a fair share of reasonable philosophical skepticism as their modern
birthright, it seems unclear why Hegel would reprimand them for demanding the
actualization of that ethos. If the answer is that doing so would enmesh them in some
kind of self-referential paradox of the sort that Russell and other analytic logicians were
keen on exposing, then that response would surely be one that a dialectician such as
Hegel should be wary of giving. If the circular relationship between condition and
conditioned, part and whole, subject and object exhibited a good and proper modality of
infinite reflection – rather than a bad infinite regress of the sort that foundational
reasoning enmeshes us in – then Hegel would have no grounds for complaint.

VII

So what is Hegel’s beef with liberalism’s empowerment of individual moral
conscience? Hegel does not mean to extinguish the individual moral agent’s legitimate
right to demand rational justification of what contingently exists. The danger in such a
demand – what makes it unreasonable and pathological – is its absolute withdrawal from
the public realm of social accountability into the private realm of fanatical self-certainty.
Pathological is the self-imposed alienation and self-reification that comes from forgetting
or willfully denying, in an act of bad faith, the social preconditions underlying one’s own
claim to be rationally certain and justified. As noted above, this kind of pathology is not
inherent within counterfactual forms of moral reasoning. Even the apparently
monological thought experiments deployed by Rawls - and even (somewhat surprisingly)
by no less a critic of monological critique as Habermas himself - have a dialogical side,
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as both of these thinkers have emphatically reminded us.21 But this fact about psychosocial pathology underscores yet another problem in Pippin’s reading of Hegel, which is
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that recognition cannot be entirely divorced from considerations of esteem and
fulfillment that Honneth and others consider integral to that account. Hegel’s endearing
epithets for pathological withdrawal from society into the inner recesses of self-certainty
- “unhappy consciousness,” “hypocrisy,” “beautiful soul,” “fanaticism,” and “absolute
terror” - suggest that the highway of despair traversed in his phenomenology of spiritual
enlightenment goes well beyond the philosophical experience of performative selfcontradiction to encompass a personally felt identity crisis. In fact, freedom
recognitively redefined is just another word for being affirmed and esteemed by one’s
fellow consociates as a fully accountable, responsible agent. What is rationally good and
rationally right converge, so that autonomy does not come at the expense of
psychological satisfaction and fulfillment.

VIII
To be sure, there is much wanting in Hegel’s account of modernity. Aside
from its Eurocentrism, its whiggish, triumphal account of human freedom collides with
our post-Foucauldian understanding of how meaning and identity are constituted and
constrained by hidden power relations. This understanding brings to bear a distinctly
modern skepticism that is not without a trace of that dangerous philosophical abstraction
which Hegel so strongly criticized. Indeed I would venture to say that the philosopher
today, in the form of the postmodern author, conceptual artist, or editorial columnist, has
become a world historical agent, and not - as in the case of Socrates – a mere symptom of
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crisis and decline. We moderns have become philosophical actors, reflecting from a
distance on the meaning of who we are and what we are doing. Our interminable project
of actualizing our free agency in dialogical confrontation with the other condemns us to
self-uncertainty in a way that Hegel, perhaps, had but an inkling.
Indeed, it might be argued these days that our existential ethics of freedom
as authentic self-ownership is as much anti-subjective as it is subjective, confirming the
worst of Hegel’s fears. But the counterfactual, aesthetic imaginary behind such efforts of
go-it-alone self-affirmation (or go-with-the-flow self-denial) is probably, as Hegel
suspected, ontologically rooted in the mundane political ethos wherein we still seek
recognition from others, come what may. The delusions of a few Robespierres and
Nietzsche-inspired futurists notwithstanding, the revolutionary experiments in fascist and
communist social engineering of the modern era are less a testimony to philosophical
imagination gone amuck than they are a reflection of a pathological ethos that has failed
to break away from the habits of long-standing tradition. Pippin himself concedes this
point when discussing the counterfactual thought-experiments proposed by Kantians like
Rawls and Habermas. True to Hegel’s thinking, these thinkers appealed to historical
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arguments in showing how the moral intuitions of European-descended peoples were
rational responses to four hundred years of religious and class struggle. Their thought
experiments were thus only devices for reconstructively clarifying (rather than justifying)
modern substantive ethical intuitions. That said, it was precisely these types of
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inspired women, workers, and marginalized minorities to imagine otherwise the dominant
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institutional roles preventing them from being recognized as full-fledged agents in the
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game of rational deliberation. All of which suggests that the struggle for recognition is
not so far removed from that mutual dialogical questioning that marks recognitive
political life in Pippin’s sense of the term.
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abstraction from ethical action, while he interprets the conscientious actor as one who
acts out of individual conviction without considering how the consequences of his actions
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that frames their one-sided forms of understanding. For Bernstein, this result rules out
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conclude that the point of no return has been reached in the intending of a not-yetcompleted act?). Holding someone liable on the basis of their character alone, apart from
intentions and actions, is equally problematic; by targeting the merely potential
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